A multi-stakeholder approach to implementing wildlife response preparedness programs

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Abstract

Arguably, while good practice in wildlife response preparedness has been well defined (IPIECA-OGP, 2014), there are very few parts of the world that could be considered well prepared. In practical terms, achieving effective preparedness can be considered more a journey than a destination, given the importance of multi-annual investment into exercises, training programs and equipment in developing wildlife response capability. In this regard, one of the most significant barriers to improving response readiness is the mistaken perception that current levels of preparedness are sufficient in the absence of an internationally agreed benchmark. Given the tendency for the complexities of oiled wildlife response to be underestimated, unqualified over-confidence in the status quo can prove extremely damaging, both in terms of failure in mitigating wildlife impact (especially in the more challenging scenarios) and the public perception of key stakeholders who apparently cannot get it right. Furthermore, it prevents any meaningful dialogue and support for ongoing investments to improve wildlife response preparedness.

To ensure an effective and realistic approach it is therefore essential that emergency response planners benchmark their own programs and systems against internationally agreed good practice. This requires both a familiarity with what is considered good practice as well as a willingness to reflect honestly on current capabilities.

This paper will explore how to effectively benchmark oiled wildlife response capability levels against defined good practice as a means to develop appropriate and realistic response plans and preparedness programs.

1. Introduction

A fundamental question for leading oil spill stakeholders (government or company) in dealing with the risk of an oil spill that may threaten wildlife populations is how proactively to prepare based on the probability of an incident and the objectives of a response. In today’s climate of economic uncertainty – including low oil prices – governments and industry are being challenged to do more for less. Without a recent pollution incident to keep the issue on the agenda – and the possibility of a large-scale incident seemingly unlikely - the political will to retain both focus and funding on response preparedness is increasingly and perhaps understandably challenged.

Nonetheless, environmental issues are high on the public agenda and governments are likely to be heavily scrutinized by the public and the media for their preparedness for and response to oil spills in the wake of an incident. As the reaction to oil pollution incidents such as the Cosco Busan in San Francisco Bay, the Macondo in the Gulf of Mexico and the MV Marathassa in Vancouver’s English Bay have demonstrated, the public expects an effective response, particularly in areas of environmental sensitivity and where environmental consciousness is high.

In any given country across the globe the question of how to develop preparedness and how far to aim in terms of preparedness levels must be answered by the response-leading authorities, even though in some countries the responsibility of mounting an appropriate response is passed on to the Polluter (“Responsible Party” or RP) as per legislation. Both parties, the authorities and the potential RPs, therefore should be intrinsically interested in
assuring that reliable resources are in an adequate state of preparedness closest to where the highest risks of wildlife pollution are.

In many countries Oil Spill Response Organizations (OSROs) are serving these interests and work on retainer contracts with authorities and companies. In some countries they are also expected to mount a wildlife response as part of their overall service package. In turn, these OSROs rely for those specialized services on wildlife organizations, who are receiving retainers or are paid for their involvements in drills or specific projects.

Globally operating oil companies seek relationships with local OSRO’s, especially in countries where risks are higher than average. In addition, they invest into operational regional or global tier-3 preparedness and response systems that can be mobilized in situations where local resources are absent or insufficient. AMOSC (Australia/Indian Pacific) and OSRL (bases all over the world) are examples of such internationally operating OSROs. They do not have developed wildlife response capacity themselves, but depend on networking organizations such as Sea Alarm\(^1\) to assist with the mobilization of specialist resources if push comes to shove.

In most countries authorities do not pass on operational leadership to an RP. These authorities therefore in fact task themselves to ensure that adequate wildlife response services can be mobilized as part of the national oil spill response and preparedness system (while passing on the cost of the response to the RP). In countries where local OSRO’s do not include oiled wildlife response in their package, the level of preparedness for wildlife response is often not existing, poorly developed and/or not integrated into the wider oil spill response.

The picture arising from this is that there is an operational gap between authorities and/or RPs on the one side and the more specialized international oiled wildlife responders on the other: often they do not have a relationship and are not directly connected. Also gaps exist between authorities and their local wildlife responders (not necessarily specialized in oiled wildlife response), both probably not aware of each other’s existence until they meet each other in the immediate aftermath of an oil spill incident that produces oiled wildlife.

This paper focuses on international good practices that have been identified for bridging these gaps, and introduces a recently developed tool that can be used as a benchmark for multi-stakeholder processes that are needed to fill gaps.

2. Discussion

2.1 Awaking awareness and good practice development

The defining of good practice in wildlife response preparedness has been previously documented (Nijkamp et al., 2014). However, given its relevance as context for the discussion in this paper – which serves as a complement to and further expansion of important themes and recurring challenges in developing preparedness - it is worth summarizing here.

The global landscape of wildlife response preparedness for oil spill incidents can be best described as sporadic, with established multi-stakeholder programs such as those in California or New Zealand being the exception to the rule that wildlife response preparedness is yet to be fully supported and integrated into oil spill preparedness programs worldwide as a matter of course. That being said, increased support for integration has been demonstrated through project funding from the oil industry and from supranational institutions for the development of agreed standards and formal international response mechanisms (Kelway et

\(^1\) Sea Alarm can be mobilized by OSRL’s shareholders to assess the needs of an oiled wildlife response and assist with filling gaps, including the mobilization of experts and other international resources.
Furthermore, individual countries and companies have taken steps to develop wildlife response plans and to implement preparedness. Examples of this include the Netherlands, where a government funded multi-annual program has engaged non-governmental organisations (NGO’s) in a process to plan, develop and test preparedness through trainings and exercises (Nijkamp et al., 2014).

Furthermore, the publication in 2014 of a good practice guide on Wildlife Response Preparedness by IPIECA - the global oil and gas industry association for environmental and social issues (IPIECA, 2013) - served as a significant milestone in the formal recognition and inclusion of wildlife response preparedness by the global oil industry in their own oil spill planning. As well as being included as one of 15 core capabilities that together constitute an industry-wide definition of good practice in tiered preparedness and response, this document also placed oiled wildlife planning and response activities within the broader context of achieving operational preparedness through multi-annual programs (IPIECA-OGP, 2014).

The notion of a living plan that moves stakeholders beyond the development of a plan on paper into operationally tested response readiness is not a new concept in the oil spill response field and yet, historically, it has not always been applied to the issue of wildlife response. This in part could be due to the fact that wildlife response has traditionally been perceived as sitting somewhat beyond the realm of other oil spill response activities - residing more directly with the volunteer efforts of well-meaning NGO’s and concerned citizens. However, as the IPIECA Good Practice Guide suggests, for any oiling event that affects wildlife, the quality of the oiled wildlife response will likely serve as the yardstick by which the overall response is also ultimately judged (IPIECA-OGP, 2014).

The philosophy behind the IPIECA Good Practice Guide is based on key observations by and experiences of the oiled wildlife response community in a variety of incidents, namely that:

- Wildlife aspects can become part of the challenges that oil spill responders have to deal with, and past incidents such as the MV Treasure, MV Tricolor & MV Oliva oil spills demonstrate that scenarios can be notoriously complex (IPIECA-OGP, 2014).
- The tragic images of oil impacted animals lead to strong emotions and reactions from the public and increased pressure on oil spill responders to offer an acceptable solution for dealing with wildlife challenges.
- These solutions cannot be implemented without appropriate legal coverage, the essential approval of ministries and agencies, the involvement of experts who can identify the options and their (relative) feasibility, the involvement of experts, work forces, specialised equipment and facilities to make options work, and the flexibility in response options to deal with the variability and scale of an unfolding scenario.
- A large number of past oiled wildlife incidents have confirmed that applied amateurism is never in the interest of (the welfare of) affected animals that arrive on the shore (Newman et al., 2003). Often the amateurism of volunteers and NGOs is criticised from within the professional oil spill response community, but the lack of preparedness of authorities or the responsible party who fail to integrate these groups is often exempt from criticism.

With these observations in mind, the published IPIECA guide aims to provide industry and government parties with an understanding of key factors that need to be coherently developed proactively to arrive at reliable forms of wildlife response preparedness.

Since its publication, The IPIECA Good Practice Guide has been increasingly recognised and utilized as a reference tool in developing increased levels of wildlife response preparedness or assessing current systems and programs. This includes its use by the Convention on the Protection of the Marine Environment of the Baltic Sea Area (HELCOM,
2014) as a resource for member states in their collective commitment to establish wildlife response plans (Nijkamp et al., 2014). The regional support by HELCOM member states for further development of wildlife response preparedness will be described in further detail below.

2.2 Implementing good practice

Whilst this developed expert/industry vision was inspired by experiences from different parts of the world, from a local perspective it may seem an overwhelming task for aspiring parties to start working on and implementing wildlife response preparedness, including perhaps uncertainty on where to begin. The environment in which preparedness needs to be developed will be different from country to country. Also in terms of administration, response systems, culture of decision making, countries are not the same and success stories from one country cannot be simply transferred to another. Who is entitled to initiate a process may also differ. Any initiative needs at least a motivated person who champions the idea and who is able create momentum. In order to move things significantly, the relevant government agencies need to become involved, design and facilitate the process, and commit themselves to its outcomes. In most cases more than one government entity is needed to be on board for developing oiled wildlife response preparedness as a wide array of responsibilities need to be addressed (e.g. oil spill response, species and habitat conservation, game, veterinarian regulations, wildlife rescue regulations etc.) which are often divided between ministries. Also responsibilities may be divided between authorities at different levels (local, provincial/regional, national). If key responsibilities have been decentralized and passed on to lower authorities, processes may have to be run similarly in multiple parts of the country. All of this helps to explain why it is often felt to be challenging or even impossible to get things going. Ignoring or denying the problem is an easier way out for sceptics who are discouraged by this perspective of burden and trouble.

An alternative way for starting a meaningful national development is via the international route of regional conventions or agreements in which countries meet to agree and develop operational tools and facilities for mutual assistance in oil spill response. Sharing and discussing internationally agreed guidelines, and discussing concrete examples and solutions elevates the idea of international common sense, and can spark initiatives in which authorities feel that they initiate processes to meet new international standards. In the case of HELCOM, countries have been discussing the issue for years and have taken far reaching measures to stimulate national and regional oiled wildlife response planning and preparedness. These measures include, for example, an adopted Recommendation, ambitious targets in the Baltic Sea Action Plan, and the assignment of an Expert Working Group on Oiled Wildlife Response. Whereas HELCOM is probably most advanced in this respect, also other regional agreements in Europe such as Bonn Agreement and Barcelona Convention have recognized the need for wildlife response planning and preparedness and adopted some basic arrangements for mobilizing and integrating response capabilities from abroad.

2.3 Examples of multi-stakeholder processes

Despite the difficulty to initiate national discussions between various stakeholders with regards to the topic of integrated oiled wildlife response, there are positive examples from Europe in which such a process has led to basic or advanced programs and corresponding levels of preparedness (see Table 1).

| Finland | Following the Erika spill (1999) the Finnish Environmental Institute (SYKE) aimed to develop a tailor made solution for oiled wildlife response to serve Finland. Over the years a modular “Bird Cleaning Unit” (BCU) was |

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conceptualized, consisting of three specialized containers, tents and equipment. In partnership with the Finnish Rescue Services and WWF Finland, the BCU was designed and built, using the Finnish oil spill fund (a fund created from levies per ton imported oil). The BCU currently forms the heart of the Finnish oiled wildlife preparedness program, led by SYKE (which is also responsible for oil spill response preparedness, therefore ensuring an integrated approach) where the Finnish Rescue Services is responsible for stockpiling and mobilization of the unit, and WWF for operational expertise (training and staffing the BCU). Exercises are carried out regularly between the partners.

Ireland
In Ireland the need for oiled wildlife preparedness was identified in the early 2000’s by various NGOs. Together they reached out the the Irish Coast Guard, the authority responsible for marine oil spill response and preparedness. The responsibility for oiled wildlife preparedness however statutorily lies with the coastal municipalities. These “coastal counties”, a total number of 20, also are responsible for coastal oil spill response, supported by the Irish Coast Guard leading and facilitating the improvement of planning and preparedness. Because most of the attention in the last decade went to developing that general preparedness, oiled wildlife received little attention. In recent years, the Irish Coast Guard revived its interest in wildlife preparedness following initiatives from the port authority’s oil spill team (SEA-PT) of the Shannon Estuary to develop wildlife response preparedness for this part of the country. A national Wildlife Response Network is now being set up under which NGOs are cooperating and which trains volunteers throughout the country as first responders. The Irish Coast Guard and SEA-PT both have invested in trailers with wildlife equipment, and are championing a campaign to have coastal counties integrating these initiatives in their planning and preparedness programs.

Belgium
Belgium faced the wildlife effects of the Tricolor incident (2003, France) when, in the immediate aftermath, many thousands of seabirds arrived on the Belgian shores. Not being prepared at all for such an event, the Belgian authorities took the initiative some months after the incident to start developing an integrated oiled wildlife response plan. The development of this plan was a process in which key authorities, NGOs and scientific institutes worked together in the course of months. After publication of the plan in 2005 no further activities were planned and although the plan was once exercised via a table top in 2007, it was running out of date. In 2015 NGOs put the issue on the table again and after a few meetings and a new incident (Flinterstar, 2015) the intention is to update the plan starting in 2016, involving all key parties again.

Netherlands
Following the Tricolor incident (see Belgium), where thousands of seabirds were affected, the Netherlands started developing a national wildlife response plan, which was signed and adopted in 2009. This plan included a dedicated training and exercise program which schedules meetings and exercises between all the signatories of the plan, including national authorities, local authorities, NGOs and scientific institutes. In 2013 a large field exercise was held in which a large tent-based temporary facility for seabird rehabilitation was built. Currently the authorities are updating the plan with lessons learnt since 2009, which is expected to be adopted in the second half of 2016. The implementation of this plan will go hand in hand with a larger scale program in which a national platform for oiled wildlife preparedness is created, signifying a consolidated authority-NGO relationship.

Table 1: Some examples of national multi-stakeholder initiatives in Europe.
2.4 Towards a self assessment tool

2.4.1 Background and approach

In spite of its benefits to the preparedness process as a helpful resource and international benchmark, the IPIECA Good Practice Guide on Wildlife Response Preparedness is still limited to providing a philosophy and a qualitative reference to preparedness only. In the case of HELCOM, where countries in the context of a regional agreement have agreed to develop their individual and collective oiled wildlife response preparedness, the need for a method and format for reporting progress was also identified. Countries in other words were looking for a tool that provided them with common language and a scoring mechanism that would enable at least a semi-quantitative monitoring of progress made in the implementation of their common program.

This request led to the development of a first iteration of a ‘Self Assessment Tool’ by the Sea Alarm Foundation as a relatively simple tool to measure the implementation of key components of good practice in wildlife response preparedness as advocated for in the IPIECA Good Practice Guide. This Self Assessment Tool has recently been adopted by HELCOM Response as a tool for reporting progress in their mutual objectives.

The Self Assessment Tool has been developed in the framework of the HELCOM activities as a one-page table in which 14 aspects can be assessed within five key components (“pillars”) of integrated oiled wildlife response preparedness (see Annex 1), namely:

1. Planning and Integration
2. Exercises
3. Training
4. Equipment and facilities
5. Partnering and funding

Horizontally each of the 14 aspects evolve along a spectrum of preparedness (see Figure 1).

![Figure 1: Spectrum of preparedness in Self-Assessment Tool](image)

The Self Assessment Tool serves as a matrix for evaluating the situation in which a country or company finds itself in. For each of the 14 aspects, the user checks only one box that corresponds with the statement that best describes the current situation. After filling in each of the 14 aspects horizontally, the user can see in which of the four columns their responses reside. If most boxes checked are in the left side of the table, the country apparently has just started its journey, or perhaps has completed a number of activities, but not coherently as part of a vision or formally agreed multi-stakeholder programme. If most checks end up in the right side of the table, it means that activities are clearly planned for and implemented in a coherent way, and that a reasonably robust system is emerging.

The Self Assessment Tool comes with a concentric graphic in which the relative scores for each component can be reflected (see Annex 1). This graphic can become an additional visual report that more clearly indicates whether or not all five components are developing in a similar coherent way, or that perhaps one or more components (e.g. training, exercises) are relatively lagging behind.
2.4.2 Assessing the tool

Some informal feedback received to date from countries who have been using the table for their assessment include some encouraging remarks (see table 2). However, the scale at which the tool is currently being used is limited (adopted in HELCOM, introduced in Bonn Agreement), and it is therefore worth providing some guiding remarks from a developer’s perspective as to what is expected from the tool.

- The table can be filled out by single stakeholders first, and be compared between them. Differences between their assessments clearly leads to discussions, but this has been experienced as positive, because different perspectives will have been used. Filling the table as a multi-stakeholder process allows stakeholders to revisit and explain their assumptions and expectations, and learn about those of others.
- Having different stakeholder groups trying to agree to one single table is a useful process, because it also leads to discussions that focus on tasks that need to happen in order to move towards the right side of the table. The statements immediately on the right of where checks have landed provide a sense of what should be done to improve on what is already there. This makes filling the table an educational experience, because it provides a sense of direction.
- Filling out the table together may make a group of stakeholders realise that for years they have been concentrating on things they collectively are good at and like to do together, but overlooking other important parts. In other words, it helps all stakeholders to recognize a persistent tunnel vision.
- Filling out the table does not take more than half an hour per stakeholder. Discussing the table between stakeholders takes another hour.
- Completing the assessment requires all stakeholders to be familiar with the terminology. Stakeholders who are in an early stage of wildlife development preparedness may have to familiarize themselves with the matter first before being able to understand the tool and fill the table.
- The Tool allows a country to decide which level of preparedness is good enough to aim for, and plan progress over time.

Table 2: Some feedback received from parties using the Self Assessment Tool

2.4.3 Educative value of the tool

Wildlife response and preparedness needs to integrate with the overall oil spill response and preparedness. It requires on one hand that the wildlife issues are well understood and that preparedness programs can lead to an effective response in a range of scenarios. On the other hand, the wildlife response must be structurally embedded so that it can be optimized as part of an overall oil spill preparedness program.

In many countries where a mature, well developed oil spill preparedness program has been developed, the wildlife issues may not be well understood. Although perhaps a slot for the integration of wildlife activities has been created, the inherent complexity of dealing effectively with more challenging wildlife scenarios is often not understood and recognized. The Self Assessment Tool tries, by design, to demonstrate that effective preparedness is built on 5 main pillars, which not only need to be developed in their own strength, but also in mutual support of each other. For each pillar, in order to place ticks in the more right-handed columns, increasingly evidence must be provided of relationships with other pillars in the same column. The column of “world class” can only be reached if a number of pillars have been developed in mutual coherence. The process of getting there via multi-stakeholder discussions and investments no doubt will deliver a better understanding of complexities in some oiled wildlife scenarios as a spin off.
2.4.4 Relative value between pillars

In putting scores down into each of the 14 aspects of preparedness, the user is making very much a qualitative assessment of relative preparedness. The tool does not provide a quantitative analysis of preparedness, which would be much harder, if not impossible, to do. Impossible, because many solutions can be thought of, and large quantity does not necessarily mean large quality. Despite its qualitative character however, the qualitative assessment should make the user think of quantitative parameters too. For instance, if one claims that training programs are in place, the next question is whether or not these programs deliver the right quantity and variety of responders at all times, in any given scenario.

From a designer's point of view, the tool serves multi-stakeholder discussions where collectively the various statements in the table are considered in mutual coherence. Stakeholder groups could make their own scores independently and then compare their results as part of multi-stakeholder meetings. Where differences appear, arguments should be exchanged, and that is where a more in-depth discussion can take place, also based on quantitative evidence. Therefore the tool does not aim to put different values to different aspects, e.g. to end up with an overall absolute score that can be compared between countries. This tool only serves in-country discussions, and international communication on progress made.

As part of a national strategy, one could aim for trying to move “towards the right” in the table, and between stakeholders the pace of that movement in the course of a, say 5 year, period could be agreed. One could try to develop one pillar first, as a priority, followed by other pillars in due course. One could also agree that the level of “strong basis” for all pillars in the end would be an end goal of the preparedness program. Therefore the tool has been designed to allow various stakeholders to find common ground for their collective intentions and endeavors, and, hopefully, consensus on where and how far to go.

2.5 Other concepts included

2.5.1 Scenario-based planning

The Tool does not explicitly aim to make a relationship with one specific oil spill scenario, but it clearly states that an integrated response plan must be based on scenario and risk analysis. This is another important aspect of wildlife response planning and establishing reasonable levels of preparedness: where, and in which period of the year, is there an apparent risk in the sense that even a relatively small volume of oil could potentially lead to an overwhelming number of animals getting oiled? It is advised that planners and stakeholders best use such a scenario and take that as a “leading scenario” to defining:

- The scale of preparedness that collectively can be reasonably aimed at, in relation to the circumstances (species and their requirements, available resources, logistic challenges, etc.) in such a part of the country, or the country as a whole.
- What the current limits of capacity are, as well as what the capacity should be to be able to meet expectations that each of stakeholder may have, including the public expectation and reaction in the heat of the incident.
- How to deal with and treat a caseload of animals that this scenario may produce that exceeds these limits (and requires, for example, large-scale euthanasia), and how to deal with the public communication of the proposed approach.

As already highlighted above, it would always be preferable to have potentially heated or difficult discussions between stakeholders about objectives, strategies and limitations as part of the pre-incident planning process, rather than having these in the immediate aftermath of an incident when response operations are being heavily scrutinized. As the IPIECA Good Practice Guide and the subsequently developed Self Assessment Tool
both demonstrate, the quality of multi-stakeholder discussions is much better if they are “informed discussions”, where all partners already understand the issues, and have developed common language to express and explore their assumptions and expectations. To achieve this level of quality requires a willingness to pro-actively engage in discussions in peacetime.

2.5.2 ‘World Class’ oiled wildlife response preparedness

The term ‘World Class’ suggests that from a global review of all response systems one could select an approach that is outstanding on the basis of a set of objective criteria. This is clearly not the case, as was argued earlier. In the tool the term “world class” refers to a situation where all stakeholders collectively have designed and developed an operational system that recognizes the importance of strength in all pillars to the same extent and mutual coherence, in function of the level of preparedness that all have agreed to try achieve. In this sense “world class” would mean a system that:

- is fully aware of its own limitations, and their relation with principles of cost-efficiency,
- has explored scenarios in which these limitations will be challenged,
- has made reliable arrangements with external parties from which additional resources can be rapidly mobilised and deployed, and
- is studying and evaluating experiences internationally in a continuous way as part of a persistent effort to improve what is already there

In this column in fact all the five categories become connected and part of a single whole. If all 14 scores end up in this column, the operators of the the preparedness system have implemented a quite complete and coherent structural program around wildlife response and preparedness, based on the contributions of multiple stakeholders and with full integration into other parts of oil spill preparedness and response.

3. Conclusion

In identifying some of the key challenges in dealing with complexity and constraints in the development of wildlife response preparedness, this paper has assessed the potential for benchmarking response capabilities and preparedness programs against defined good practice, namely the publication of the IPIECA Good Practice Guide in 2014.

Beyond the very real issue of limited funding and competing priorities, perhaps the greater challenge is the tendency to ignore or underestimate the complexity of dealing with oiled wildlife (regardless of which strategy or strategies are employed) and therefore overestimate what existing resources can cope with. While the perceived risk of an oiled wildlife incident and therefore the political will to effectively prepare may be low, it is hard to deny that it would always be preferable to assess capabilities and define limitations in peacetime than to try to do so when the camera is rolling during an incident.

This paper does not advocate for plan holders necessarily having to strive for a particular wildlife response strategy or level of capability but rather that, at the very least, wildlife stakeholders and responsible parties should be willing to look into the mirror and undertake an honest evaluation of their current capacity. Doing so, allows for plans to be developed accordingly and realistic limitations set. From this point, realistic objectives for any future development of preparedness can also be established.

Perhaps the final obstacle to undertaking an honest self-assessment is simply not knowing where to start or how to evaluate whether current preparedness levels are sufficient. While the IPIECA Good Practice Guide is an important and helpful document, government stakeholders have requested further assistance in assessing current programs as part of future development efforts. Subsequently, the first iteration of a self-assessment matrix has been developed as a semi-quantitative tool. This tool has been adopted by HELCOM Response as
part of their efforts to develop wildlife response plans and will be used by member states in the Baltic region to report on their progress towards this goal.

While the self-assessment tool is now in use in its current form, it is important to note that this is only a first iteration that will likely be refined further as more formal feedback is received. Over time the aim is to shape a tool that serves as a valuable, pragmatic resource and accompaniment to the multi-stakeholder journey of developing wildlife response preparedness.
### 4. Annexes

#### Table 1: Self-Assessment Matrix

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Needed for (cost) effective oiled wildlife response</th>
<th>To be initiated</th>
<th>Important gaps to be filled</th>
<th>Strong basis</th>
<th>World class</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Planning and integration</td>
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<tr>
<td>□ Only an oil spill response plan exists; it may or may not have reference to OWR</td>
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<tr>
<td>□ No authority so far has taken responsibility to oversee (the quality of) wildlife response and preparedness</td>
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<tr>
<td>□ It is no common rationale for (the development of) an integrated OWR plan.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Exercises</td>
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<tr>
<td>□ No OWR exercises take place</td>
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<td>□ There is no actor who is interested to organises OWR exercises</td>
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<td>□ The importance of exercises such as table tops, field exercises and facility exercises is acknowledged but not acted upon</td>
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<tr>
<td>□ Exercises have had and ad hoc character and were not related to a plan or training programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>□ Wildlife aspects are exercised by one or more parties but not by everyone together</td>
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<tr>
<td>□ Ad hoc exercises were limited to table tops and/or simple field exercises</td>
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<td>□ Exercises take place coherently every year and look at different aspects of a response</td>
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<td>□ Exercises are attended by all stakeholders together but there is no clear relationship with training</td>
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<td>□ Exercises are structural but a large mobilisation exercise testing the build up and operations of a facility has not been held to date</td>
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<td>□ Some but not all stakeholders have assumed their roles in a wildlife response and train their key personnel to be able to take responsibilities according to clear job descriptions</td>
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<tr>
<td>□ Training at different levels (convergent responder, advanced responder, section heads, manager) is recognized, but training is limited to the volunteer (convergent) level.</td>
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<tr>
<td>□ Management roles are not trained</td>
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<tr>
<td>□ Trained personnel from different stakeholder organisations is offered regular opportunities to exercise together, to practice their skills in realistic scenarios</td>
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<tr>
<td>Training</td>
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<tr>
<td>□ Roles and responsibilities in a wildlife response are not clarified and not discussed between stakeholders</td>
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<td>□ There is no in-country expertise available to provide training courses</td>
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<td>□ There are parties interested in being trained</td>
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<tr>
<td>□ Some but not all stakeholders have assumed their roles in a wildlife response and train their key personnel to be able to take responsibilities according to clear job descriptions</td>
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<td>□ Training at different levels (convergent responder, advanced responder, section heads, manager) is recognized, but training is limited to the volunteer (convergent) level.</td>
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<td>□ Management roles are not trained</td>
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<td>□ Trained staff are qualified according to international standards to assist with training other responders or responders abroad</td>
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<td>Equipment and facilities</td>
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<td>□ The role of facilities in OWR is recognised, but plans to realise them have not been developed or tested.</td>
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<td>□ Equipment stockpiles are unknown or absent</td>
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<td>□ It is clear what facilities are needed for different purposes in a wildlife response. At this stage, only small size facilities can be used or developed, equipped and staffed, relating to relatively unchallenging incident scenarios</td>
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<td>□ The use and development of facilities has been described in the plan and scripts and criteria are available for scaling up facility size to a desired maximum level that can be equipped and staffed</td>
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<td>□ The use and development of fit-for-purpose facilities is the subject of specific exercises in an exercise programme in which the performance of contractors and responsible organisations is regularly tested and evaluated</td>
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Equipment stockpiles are available in-country, but an analysis of their completeness has not been made.

Equipment mobilisation in relation to facility build up and field activities is regularly tested and evaluated as part of an exercise programme.

Partnering and funding

- No dedicated central funds are explicitly available for wildlife preparedness development.
- It is recognised that wildlife impacts or response can be controversial in terms of public reactions, but no multi-stakeholder activities have been organised to date to explore common ground and solutions.
- There is a high reliance on quality tier-3 resources from abroad, but the procedures to invite and integrate a tier-3 team have not been discussed or described.

Funds are available to the extend that some ad hoc activities can be financed; there is no multi-year approach nor budget available.

Multi-stakeholder meetings have been discussing wildlife impacts and options for a response, and it is clear that different views and approaches are possible, but no actions have been taken to find solutions in bridging different opinions.

Quality tier-3 resources for response assistance have been identified and discussions take place on mobilisation procedures, but no formal procedure has been agreed nor described.

A multi-year budget has been created to finance a number of activities, contracts and equipment investments. Still it is expected from various key stakeholders to contribute in-kind to the agreed preparedness level.

Multi-stakeholder processes have led to the agreed objectives and strategies for an OWR.

The assistance from quality tier-3 resources have been described as part of the wildlife response plan. Tier-3 mobilisation however is not part of an exercise programme.

A multi-year budget has been created that allows one or more key stakeholders to coordinate an all encompassing programme and overseeing investments, training and exercises, and provide professional staff to undertake key roles and responsibilities in the management of a response; a key authority oversees that targets are met by the programme.

A response will involve a broad range of stakeholders in the response activities, ensuring different viewpoints are respected and publicly communicated as of one voice so that the public is likely to support the response and its decision taking.

The assistance from quality tier-3 resources is described as part of the wildlife response plan and mobilisation procedures are regularly exercised and tested.
Figure 2: Concentric graphic with example of completed self-assessment
5. References


